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Glenn McGee argues that the time is now for debating the morality of patenting human genes. In one sense he
is surely right. While thousands of patents have been issued or are pending on many gene sequences, public
policy with respect to ownership of the human genome is still far from settled. So a debate about the ethics of
patenting genes is, if nothing else, timely. In another sense however, Professor McGee is wrong.
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ARTHUR L. CAPLAN
Glenn McGee argues1 that the time is
now for debating the morality of pat-
enting human genes. In one sense he
is surely right. While thousands of pat-
ents have been issued or are pending
on many gene sequences, public pol-
icy with respect to ownership of the
human genome is still far from set-
tled.2 So a debate about the ethics of
patenting genes is, if nothing else,
timely. In another sense however, Pro-
fessor McGee is wrong.
While there is plenty of interest, as re-
flected in the growing literature on the
subject,3,4 in debating the moral accept-
ability of patents being issued on bits
and pieces of human DNA, invocations
of ethics are often nothing more than
weapons in the battle to control own-
ership of what many believe will be the
most lucrative patents in all of science
for decades to come. When looked at
closely, talk of ethics is more often than
not a cover for self- or corporate inter-
est. Those who are trailing in the race for
control of a particular sequence or set of
sequences are a bit quicker to agonize
over the morality of patenting than are
those preparing an application to the
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office.
Discussions of the ethics of patent-
ing are not always rhetorical. There
are honest differences of opinion about
which policies of ownership and con-
trol best serve the public interest. There
are those who think that issuing pat-
ents will provide the necessary incen-
tive to transfer knowledge from the
lab bench to the clinic or the phar-
macy shelf.5 Others are not persuaded
that allowing the patenting of human
DNA sequences is the way to get the
greatest practical return on the pub-
lic’s investment in the genome project.6
The question of the benefits associ-
ated with patenting is a crucial one
for American public policy.7 It is also
an ethical argument in that the conse-
quences of an act or policy certainly
must be weighed in any assessment of
the ethics of allowing patents. But,
when the fight is over the desirability
of patents for enhancing technology
transfer then the debate is as much a
matter of economics as it is of ethics.
There are what amount to essen-
tially ethical objections to the patent-
ing of human genes. But, those who
have fundamental ethical objections to
the patenting of human genes have
not always been clear about precisely
what their moral objections are.8 To
many, efforts to block the patenting of
the human genome simply boil down
to objections to the scientific study and
manipulation of that genome. When pat-
enting is made the target of purely moral
objections, those making the objections
often seem less comfortable with the
push to map, sequence, and engineer
the human genome than they are with
the morality of patents themselves.9 Nev-
ertheless, there are purely ethical rea-
sons to oppose patenting and they must
be addressed by the biomedical, legal,
and policy communities.
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Moral objections to the patenting of
human DNA fall into three areas. It is
wrong to patent because to do so is an
act of arrogance or hubris. It is wrong
to patent because patenting confers
ownership over that which ought not
to be commodified or turned into the
object of commerce. And patenting is
morally wrong because it allows indi-
vidual ownership over something that
is community property or a public
good.
To some it is simply inconceivable
that anyone could lay claim to the
ownership of the blueprint for human-
ity.10 No human being, no matter how
clever or how innovative, should be
allowed to lay claim to the fundamen-
tal knowledge that defines our spe-
cies. Even if, as McGee suggests,11
genes are the creations of our scien-
tific theories in as much as we orga-
nize the world according to our needs
and interests, it is still the case that
laying claim to own what it is we find
in the biological world cannot be done
without an arrogance or hubris about
our creativity and its role in reveal-
ing genomes. The fact that humans
are bright enough as a species to de-
cipher some of our essential biologi-
cal instructions does not put us in a
position to say that we own this in-
formation any more than discovering
Newton’s laws or the principles of
thermodynamics or fluid mechanics al-
lows anyone to say that they own this
information. Those who do taxonomy
and systematics know that Professor
McGee is right —they are imposing an
idiosyncratic and peculiarly human set
of organizational principles upon the
natural world. But in doing so they
do not thereby derive a claim to own
the species, genera, or phyla that they
baptize. Similarly, although the clev-
erness and skill of genomic scientists
ought to be admired and even to be
used as the basis of tenure and salary
promotion, it does not constitute a
valid basis for ownership claims over
the content of the information genom-
ics produces.
Related to this ethical objection is the
worry that patenting human genes is
profane.12 The notion behind this objec-
tion is that patenting is wrong because
it is commercializing what ought to re-
main outside the realm of commerce.
There is no way to treat our genes as our
property without thereby cheapening
and degrading the molecules that play
an essential role in making us human.
Patenting our genes is the moral equiv-
alent of slavery —granting legal owner-
ship over something that ought to be
beyond commercial possession by any
person, government, or corporation. The
resistance to patenting that is promi-
nent in many cultures and religious out-
looks is based on the idea that the only
way to confer a respect for human life
and humanity is to place some aspects
of ourselves outside the world of busi-
ness and markets. This is one reason that
slavery and prostitution are seen as mor-
ally wrong. It is why western societies
will not permit a market in human body
parts or tissues. Prohibitions on the sale
of babies reflect the idea that although
there might well be a market that would
emerge for the transfer of new human
lives it would be repugnant to permit it
to exist. And it is why it is not legally
acceptable to offer human cadavers for
sale on the open market. To cement re-
spect for human life, the body and its
parts must not be made the object of
commerce.13
The final in principle moral reason
advanced against the moral permissi-
bility of patents is that patents cannot
be issued because the ownership of
the human genome is already settled.
Allowing individual or corporate pat-
ents ignores the fact that it is our com-
mon genetic glue that holds us together
as a species, and that is something all
of humanity has as its common legacy.
If the human genome is viewed as a
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family heirloom or picture book, then
although it could be bought or sold,
putting it on the market not only threat-
ens its symbolic and cultural signifi-
cance, but transforms what ought to
be a family treasure into just another
bit of private property.
Few scientists view genes, even hu-
man genes, in this way. It may seem
simply silly to work oneself into an
emotional frenzy over strands of nu-
cleic acid. But, even if they are not
always well articulated, it is precisely
these metaphysical moral concerns that
are at the heart of the objections, es-
pecially religiously based objections,
to patents. And, contrary to the views
of McGee and others who favor al-
lowing patents to go forward,14 these
concerns will not be addressed by talk
of optimizing technology transfer or
providing appropriate fiscal reward for
those who have labored long and hard
at the lab bench and computer to crack
our genetic code. Those who believe
there is an essence to humankind and
a specialness to human beings ground
their belief in heredity, blood, ances-
try, and roots. These are concepts that
lead directly to genes. It takes a lot of
capital investment, training, and hard
work to find and identify genes. But
these facts will not persuade those who
see our genetic inheritance as defini-
tive of who we are to reward those
who map and sequence our code with
ownership rights.
For there to be a sense of the sacred,
there must be a sphere that is profane.
To have a sense of the dignity of hu-
man life there must be an acknowledg-
ment that there are some parts of our
biology that we hold in common and
keep outside the marketplace. What we
all have in common is our genome, and
as such it cannot belong to any one of
us. These are the core arguments against
genetic patents. Those who favor allow-
ing patenting to continue in this area will
have to meet the claim that keeping the
human body and its parts off limits to
the forces of the market is an important
way to make a moral statement about
who we are.
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